The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law by Chamallas, Martha
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 2
Fall 2000
The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and
Tort Law
Martha Chamallas
University of Pittsburg School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chamallas, Martha (2000) "The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 6:
Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol6/iss1/2
The Disappearing Consumer,
Cognitive Bias and Tort Law
Martha Chamallas*
INTRODUCTION
The term "hidden curriculum" is sometimes used by academics
to describe an underlying structure beneath the catalogue listing
of required and elective courses.' In the hidden curriculum are the
"must-take" courses, the courses which are considered to be the
most important and central and which acquire a higher status as a
result of their informal ranking.2 Other offerings are placed at the
margins of the curriculum. Arguably, they have a lower status,
even those they carry the same number of course credits and are
no more elective than the more mainstream courses.3 This notion
of a hidden hierarchy is not unique to the structures of educational
curricula. If you reflect on your own experience, I suspect that you
have often had occasion to ferret out the implicit hierarchies that
operate in the institutions and cultural groupings that form part of
your life.
In this essay I advance the view that consumers and their in-
terests have a marginal status in the study of law, generally
squeezed out by courses and discussions focused on the legal status
and regulation of business. I assert that the implicit low ranking of
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful to my research
assistant, Erik Zissu, a law student and Ph.D. in American History, for his valua-
ble contribution to this essay.
1. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law
School Curriculum, 14 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 3-12 (1983) (discussing the difference
between core curriculum and peripheral courses).
2. I have in mind such favorites as Corporations, Income Tax and Trusts &
Estates. These are typically high enrollment courses that are not, strictly speak-
ing, required courses.
3. Although informal rankings differ from school to school, typically courses
such as Sex Discrimination Law, Poverty Law and Native American Law have low
enrollments and are considered peripheral or "boutique" courses.
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consumer law and consumer issues in the current law school cur-
riculum is a function of three interrelated factors: (1) the historical
origins of the course; (2) the association of consumers with less
dominant social groups, particularly women; and (3) the dormant
state of the consumer movement in the United States. I then con-
nect this assertion to the larger legal picture by reflecting more
generally on implicit hierarchies in tort law.
This symposium is dedicated in part to dissecting consumers,
explaining how they make choices, how they understand and pro-
cess information, and how they are influenced or manipulated by
advertising and marketing forces. Its innovation is to evaluate
products liability law in light of behavioral research in psychology
and, in the process, to question the foundation of much of the cur-
rent legal doctrine and scholarship. The specific target of the cri-
tique is the construct of the "rational consumer," that cousin of the
rational actor who has surfaced in so many law school offerings
influenced by the law and economics movement.
The lens of behavioral research allows us to see that there are
times when consumers act like rational fools, systematically
under-estimating or over-estimating risk. However, even this aug-
mented portrait of the consumer is quite abstract and objectified.
What is obscured from these accounts is that, at least in some his-
torical periods, consumers in the United States have self-con-
sciously tried to define their own interests.4 In approaching the
key recurring questions, such as the level of safety consumers de-
sire or the ethics of certain types of advertising and marketing
practices, a broader, more historical lens seems in order.
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAw AND THE HISTORY OF
THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT
This symposium's focus on the consumer took me back to the
early 1970s when I was a law student and the law and economics
movement had not yet taken hold in the legal academy.5 At that
4. See infra text accompanying notes 18-53.
5. Richard Posner published the first edition of his casebook, Economic Anal-
ysis of Law, in 1973. The field did not begin to take off, however, until the early
1980s. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of Law,
1997 Wis. L. Rev. 433, 434. By 1988, Robert D. Cooter and Thomas S. Ulen re-
ported that having a course in law and economics had become a "part of the stan-
dard curriculum in leading law schools" and that a majority of the federal judiciary
had been trained via short courses provided by academic centers for the study of
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time, the consumer had direct billing in the law school curriculum
and the course in Consumer Protection Law was considered one of
the new, relevant courses to take. Students were being assigned to
read prominent consumer law cases in the required, first year cur-
riculum. In Contracts, Judge Skelly Wright's opinion in Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture6 addressed the legality of adhesion
contracts and introduced the concept of unconscionability in con-
sumer finance loans.7 In Constitutional Law, the Supreme Court's
landmark procedural due process case, Fuentes v. Shevin,8 ac-
corded low-income minority consumers the right to be heard before
their goods were repossessed; the interests of senior citizens and
low-income patients were at the center of Virginia Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,9 the Supreme Court
case which interpreted the First Amendment to invalidate a ban
against advertising the prices of prescription drugs. This was a mo-
ment in history when the consumer protection movement was
quite visible. In 1965 Ralph Nader had published his famous book,
law and economics. Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, preface to Law and Eco-
nomics (1988). By the early 1990s, Ulen claimed that "economic analysis suffused a
modern legal education, even one devoid of an explicit course in law and econom-
ics." Ulen, supra, at 434.
6. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
7. See id. at 447-50. The famous case involved a challenge to an installment
contract for furniture, in which the seller reserved the right to repossess all items
(even those purchased years before) if the buyer became delinquent in payments.
Ora Williams, a woman receiving public assistance, had charged $1800 worth of
merchandise over a period of years and paid $1400 of the debt, when Walker-
Thomas furniture sought to repossess all the items because she defaulted on a
$500 stereo. Judge Wright recognized that standard form contracts could be "un-
conscionable," as evidenced by the gross inequality in bargaining position between
the parties. See id. at 449-50. For commentary on Walker, see Katheryn K Rus-
sell, Affirmative (Re)Action: Anything But Race, 45 Am. L. Rev. 803, 803-04 (1996);
Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 3
Temple Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 89 (1993); Stewart Maccaulay, Bambi Meets
Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 Houston L. Rev.
575, 578-82 (1989); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts Have Failed the Poor, N.Y. Times
Mag., Mar. 9, 1969, at 26.
8. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes also involved a dispute in connection with an
installment sale of household merchandise, namely a stove and a stereo. When she
defaulted, the plaintiff challenged the repossession of these items, claiming that
the stove was defective and the manufacturer had failed to repair it. See id. at 70-
71. The Supreme Court held that she was entitled to a hearing before the repos-
session could take place. See id. at 96.
9. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Unsafe at Any Speed,'0 which exposed the safety defects in the de-
sign of the Chevrolet Corvair." For many observers, it looked like
the political mobilization of consumers might have the effect of
transforming consumers into a recognizable social and political
force.
In the early 1970s, consumers also found their way into the
law school curriculum in the relatively new offering called Prod-
ucts Liability or Enterprise Liability. 12 Less than a decade before,
in 1963, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court had writ-
ten Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,13 the pathbreaking case
that introduced strict liability for defective products into the law.
In 1965, the American Law Institute had promulgated the influen-
tial §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which adopted
strict liability for "unreasonably dangerous" defective products. 14
The commentary to that section stated that unreasonable danger
was to be judged by consumer expectations, that is, whether the
article was "dangerous to any extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."15
Although both courses dealt with consumers, their focus was
very different. The emphasis of Consumer Protection Law was on
consumer fraud and nonphysical injuries. We studied Truth in
Lending, sex discrimination by banks and other credit institutions,
privacy issues and deceptive advertising. 16 Empowerment of con-
10. Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed (1965).
11. One historian of the consumer movement explains that the Nader book
was much more than an expos6 of the Corvair. "It was an indictment of the entire
automobile industry, and by extension other giant corporations, for ignoring the
consumer's desire for a safe car and contributing so massively to air pollution."
Robert N. Mayer, The Consumer Movement: Guardians of the Marketplace 28
(1989).
12. A casebook by Keeton & Shapo entitled "Products and the Consumer: De-
fective and Dangerous Products" was first published by Foundation Press in 1970.
The first Nutshell on Products Liability by Jerry J. Phillips was published in 1974.
13. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
14. Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A (1965).
15. Id. at cmt. i. The consumer expectations test was largely dropped in the
new Restatement of Products Liability. It was reserved only for food and some
used products. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §§ 2, 7 & 8, cmts. g &
h.
16. Two contemporary casebooks, for example, cover such topics as regulation
of deceptive trade practices by the FTC, truth in lending, protection of consumer
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sumers was at the center of the course. Although it was never ex-
plicitly noted, I believe that the prototypical plaintiff in Consumer
Protection Law was the homemaker or perhaps the elderly woman
who was had been tricked or exploited into buying something she
really did not want. The course also had a race and class dimen-
sion: many of the victims of consumer fraud were poor and
minorities.
In contrast to Consumer Protection Law, the course in Prod-
ucts Liability focused on the consumer only indirectly. In Products
Liability, the light shone on the conduct of manufacturers, particu-
larly their decisions with respect to design and safety. Although
one of the topics in the course was breach of warranty and non-
physical harm, the clear emphasis of the course was on physical
harm to tort victims. The prototypical plaintiff of the Products Lia-
bility course was not the homemaker, but rather the (middle-class)
homeowner using his lawnmower, or the man injured, like the
plaintiff in Greenman, using his home power tool.
The differences in the emphasis and imagery of the two
courses was understandable. To some extent, the course in Con-
sumer Protection Law still bore some of the traces of the history of
the consumer movement in the United States. 17 To a greater de-
gree than the Torts offspring of Products Liability, Consumer Pro-
tection Law was a course sparked by a social movement and
devoted to the study of legislative and regulatory measures that
were a product of that movement.
Historians of the consumer movement in the United States
typically begin their story with the Progressive Era. The National
Consumers League (NCL), founded at the turn of the twentieth
century, and headed by the progressive reformer Florence Kelley,
first enlisted consumer action to protest abuses suffered by labor-
ers.' 8 Their campaigns centered on the abolition of child labor and
privacy (Fair Credit Reporting Act), sex and race discrimination in credit transac-
tions (Equal Credit Opportunity Act) and protection against coercive enforcement
tactics. See Michael Greenfield, Consumer Transactions (3d ed. 1999); Douglas J.
Whaley, Problems and Materials on Consumer Law (2d ed. 1998).
17. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 10-33 (describing three eras of consumer
activism).
18. See Kathryn Kish Sklar, Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work: The Rise
of Women's Political Culture, 1830-1900, 143 (1995). Kelley had a major role in
determining the agenda of the NCL. She was a socialist who had translated En-
gels and Marx while studying abroad. When her husband began battering her, she
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sweatshops. Women in particular played a key role in this first
wave of consumer activism. 19 An important early campaign of the
NCL, for example, tied the interests of largely middle-class female
consumers to the plight of women and children who worked in the
textile industry.20 The NCL awarded its "White Label" to manufac-
turers who shunned child labor, and who followed state regula-
tions on overtime and safety regulations pertaining to female
employees. 21 By urging its membership to purchase only White La-
bel garments, the NCL hoped to have an impact not only on what
consumers purchased, but on the working conditions under which
such goods were produced.22 This interjection of the consumer into
the production process was new to the laissez-faire world of Ameri-
can industrialism and afforded the first glimpse of the potential of
consumers to use their buying power to effect social change. The
campaign of these early consumer activists had a distinctly moral
tone: they were not interested in lower prices if it meant endorsing
cutthroat competition that drove down the price of goods through
fled with her three children to Chicago, where she teamed up with Jane Addams at
Hull House. The need to change the oppressive social conditions facing women and
labor remained a constant theme throughout her work on behalf of consumers.
19. Robert Mayer identifies three distinct periods of consumer activism: the
1880s to World War I; the late 1920s to World War II; and the late 1950s to the
early 1970s. In these periods, consumers organized, often around a particular pub-
licized cause, effected social and legal change and then disbanded. Mayer asserts
that the most recent Nader-inspired wave of the consumer movement ended in
1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan. Mayer, supra note 11 at 10-33.
20. Kathryn Kish Sklar, Two Political Cultures in the Progressive Era: The
National Consumers' League and the American Association for Labor Legislation,
in U.S. Women's History: New Feminist Essays 33,41 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds.,
1995).
21. The NCL also campaigned for the passage of maximum hours legislation
and minimum wage legislation for women workers. It targeted women workers in
part because of concerns that the courts would rule unconstitutional any protective
labor legislation that extended to all workers. To defend the gender-specific protec-
tive labor legislation, the NCL argued that women workers tended to be young,
unskilled, and vulnerable because they were unlikely to be represented by labor
unions. Defenders also invoked women's maternal role, asserting that women
working long hours under oppressive conditions could lead to birth defects and
other ill effects on the health and well being of children. In 1908, the Supreme
Court upheld maximum hours legislation for women, citing the maternal justifica-
tion. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). With respect to minimum wage
legislation for women, however, the Court refused to sustain such legislation until
the political tide turned in 1937. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp. 261 U.S. 525
(1923) (holding minimum wage for women unconstitutional); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage for women).
22. See Sklar, supra note 20, at 44-46.
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the use of cheap labor and unhealthy working conditions.23 Histo-
rian Kathryn Kish Sklar explained that the NCL and Florence Kel-
ley recognized that "righteously made goods cost more."24 Through
the consumer campaign, the NCL enlisted the predominantly
white, Protestant membership to align themselves with women
and children from a different social class, many of whom were im-
migrants and Catholics.25
One early target of the NCL, which would turn out to become a
persistent theme of successive waves of the consumer movement,
was its skeptical stance toward advertising. Kelley regarded adver-
tising as contrary to the consumer's interest, particularly the
moral consumer who used her freedom of choice to advance her
political as well as economic objectives. 26 For Kelley, advertise-
ments were "distinctly not meant to educate or instruct, but to
stimulate, persuade, incite, entice, and induce the indifferent to
purchase."27
After World War I, the volume of advertising of consumer
products increased exponentially as consumers began to purchase
a great variety of new electrical appliances and household prod-
ucts. 28 In the 1920s, however, advertising contained little objective
information about the product itself, focusing instead on how
purchasing the product would bring consumers "health, happiness,
comfort, love, [and] social success."29 Historians agree that the
"point of greatest friction between business and the consumer
23. The publication in 1906 of Upton Sinclair's, The Jungle, a muckraking ex-
pos6 of the meat packing industry, had shone the national spotlight on the inhu-
mane and grossly unsanitary conditions prevailing at the Chicago stockyards.
Although Sinclair wrote the book to inspire changes in the treatment of workers,
the public outcry focused more on the risk to the consumer's health. Sinclair is
reported to have said, "I aimed for the nation's heart, but I hit its stomach in-
stead." Mayer, supra note 11, at 17-18.
24. Sklar, supra note 20, at 45.
25. See id. at 44.
26. See id.
27. Id. (citing Florence Kelley, Aims and Principles of the Consumers' League,
5 Am. J. Soc. 289, 294 (1899)).
28. It was not until the mid-1920s that a majority of American households had
electricity. Once there was electricity, families then began purchasing a number of
electrical appliances for the first time, including refrigerators, washing machines,
electric irons, sewing machines and vacuum cleaners. See Mayer, supra note 11, at
19.
29. Id. at 20 (citing Stephen Fox, The Mirror Makers 95 (1984)).
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movement was advertising."30 As Lucy Black Creighton describes
the rift:
The movement resented the power of advertising over con-
sumer values and asserted that advertising was a major force
in establishing the patterns of American consumption. It saw
advertising as often encouraging people to use their incomes
in unwise and essentially wasteful expenditures. The con-
sumer movement maintained that there was considerable ev-
idence to the effect that highly advertised goods were nearly
always higher in price and just as often of lower quality than
similar unadvertised products. It was particularly critical of
advertising that emphasized the emotional rather than the
intelligent reasons for buying a good-such as buying to
achieve popularity, success, or status. According to the con-
sumer movement, advertising, instead of providing informa-
tion that would assist consumers in making wise buying
decisions, succeeded only in adding to their confusion-and
vulnerability.3 1
The consumer-oriented antidote to useless, and sometimes
false and misleading, advertising was independent product testing.
One famous champion of product testing was Frederick Schlink,
who with co-author Stuart Chase, published the best selling book
Your Money's Worth in 1927, which one author describes as "the
Uncle Tom's Cabin of the consumer movement."32 The book ex-
posed widespread consumer fraud, manipulative sales practices
and deceptive advertising that "wasted the consumer's purchasing
power and robbed the nation of the true benefits of mass produc-
tion."33 At the end of the book, the authors invited the reader to
send in a dollar to receive a listing of products which had been
rated as superior or inferior in the experience of users (who inci-
dentally belonged to a club of which Schlink was a member).3 4
When they were deluged with requests for the list, Schlink devel-
30. Lucy Black Creighton, Pretenders to the Throne: The Consumer Move-
ment in the United States 28 (1976). See also The Consumer Movement: Lectures
by Colston E. Warne 91 (Richard L.D. Morse ed., 1993) ("Fundamentally, it was
advertising which was historically responsible for the birth and growth of the con-
sumer movement here and abroad.").
31. Creighton, supra note 30, at 28.
32. Warne, supra note 30, at 19.
33. Mayer, supra note 11, at 20.
34. See Warne, supra note 30, at 21.
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oped the list into a consumer information and testing service,
which became known as Consumers' Research. 35
In part because of the threat represented by consumer product
testing, by the Depression the consumer movement had developed
a very adversarial relationship with American business. For ex-
ample, the fear of being sued for libel led Consumers' Research to
adopt the practice of requiring their subscribers to sign a declara-
tion promising they would keep the product ratings in complete
confidence and would not disclose them to anyone outside their im-
mediate family.38 Businesses countered the consumer activists'
campaign against advertising by arguing that advertising fostered
the creation of mass markets and increased the availability of con-
sumer goods.37 Perhaps most importantly, business linked adver-
tising with consumer choice and contended that "to distrust
advertising was to oppose choice."38 Some even regarded the con-
sumer movement's distrust of advertising as un-American. 39 In
1938, the House Committee on Un-American Activities investi-
gated charges that Consumers Union (a spin-off from Consumers'
Research) was a communist front organization and in the 1950s
Consumers Union made it onto the federal list of Subversive Orga-
nizations. 40 McCarthyism and the conservative political climate of
the 1950s served to dampen the consumer movement at a time
when Americans became voracious consumers during the booming
economy following World War 11.41
The third wave of consumer activism coincided generally with
the more liberal political climate of the 1960s and the movements
for social equality that escalated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Like in the earlier eras, consumer activists complained about ma-
nipulative advertising 42 and the existence of unsafe products.43
What marked out this era from earlier bursts of energy, however,
35. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 21.
36. See Warne, supra note 30, at 25.
37. See Creighton, supra note 30, at 28.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See Warne, supra note 30, at 138.
41. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 25-26.
42. See Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders 3-4 (1957). Packard set the
stage for the renewed attack on manipulative advertising. He argued that, through
motivation research, companies led consumers to make buying decisions based on
subconscious, rather than rational processes, casting doubt on the authenticity of
consumer choice.
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was the presence of Ralph Nader and his organization's impact on
the federal government.
Nader first became a household word when he took on General
Motors and charged that American automobile manufacturers had
succeeded in making the public believe that safety issues revolved
around the driver and the highway, rather than the design of the
automobile itself.44 After Nader's highly visible campaign against
the Corvair, General Motors hired private detectives to try to se-
cure information to discredit Nader and his book.45 Perhaps be-
cause Nader led such a spartan existence,46 shunning material
goods and making it impossible for critics to uncover conflicts of
interests, his reputation remained untarnished. In a characteristic
Naderesque move, he sued General Motors for invasion of privacy
and used the half-million dollar settlement to finance his growing
crusades.47
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nader's Raiders 48
increasingly turned their focus on the failure of federal regulatory
agencies to carry out their statutory responsibilities and protect
consumers. The charge was that the agencies were often inactive
and sometimes became the captives of the business interests they
were supposed to regulate. 49 In Nader's view, in an economy where
large concentrated corporate enterprises wielded considerable
market power, government regulation was necessary to afford con-
sumers a measure of countervailing power.50 Nader's organization
43. The thalidomide scandal in the early 1960s, sparked by the marketing of a
drug which produced birth defects when taken by pregnant women in Great Brit-
ain and West Germany, prompted calls for stricter regulation of drugs in the
United States, particularly when it was revealed that only the efforts of a single
FDA doctor had prevented the marketing of the drug in the United States. See
Mayer, supra note 11, at 26-27.
44. See Creighton, supra note 30, at 52.
45. See id.
46. One historian describes Nader as the "nation's premier consumer advo-
cate" who is the "ultimate nonconsumer!" Mayer, supra note 11, at 29. The my-
thology that grew up around Nader stems from the fact that he did not own a car,
lived in a rooming house in a low-rent district, read only nonfiction and had virtu-
ally no social life. See id.
47. See Creighton, supra note 30, at 52.
48. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 28-29 (describing how Nader's Raiders, typi-
cally idealistic students who spent their summers in Washington, descended on
federal agencies such as the FTC, ICC and the FDA).
49. See id.
50. See Creighton, supra note 30, at 54.
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helped to create a political climate that produced the wide array of
consumer protection legislation, from the creation of the National
Traffic and Vehicle Safety Act,5' to legislation protecting against
harmful products such as flammable fabrics and radiation, to dis-
closure acts designed to promote truth in lending and packaging.52
The flurry of activity that peaked in the early 1970s with the crea-
tion of the Consumer Product Safety Commission became the criti-
cal core of the course in Consumer Protection.5 3 By the 1980
election of Ronald Reagan, however, the third wave of consumer
activism was dead and would remain dormant for the next twenty
years.
RECURRING THEMES OF ORGANIZED CONSUMER ACTISM
The foregoing sketch of the history of the consumer movement
in the United States suggests some continuities and enduring
themes, despite its admittedly sporadic and amorphous character.
Additionally, the history helps to explain why consumer issues re-
ceived more attention in the law school curriculum of the 1970s
than at present.
First, it seems clear that periods of consumer activism and at-
tempts by consumer groups and organizations to define and ad-
vance their own interests has coincided with larger periods of
social reform. Not surprisingly, the first wave of activism occurred
during the Progressive Era,54 the second wave corresponded to the
New Deal55 and the most recent wave was part of the Great Soci-
ety initiatives that marked the late 1960s and early 1970s.1 These
were periods in which the status quo was challenged, including the
conventional wisdom that what is good for business is automati-
cally good for the consumer.
To a significant extent, the consumer movement in the United
States has defined itself in opposition to business. Much like the
labor movement to which it was originally linked, the consumer
movement has sought to create a collective voice for consumers
that would serve to balance the enormous power of corporate en-
51. See id. at 52.
52. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 29.
53. See id. at 29-30.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27; Mayer, supra note 11, at 12-19.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38; Mayer, supra note 11, at 19-25.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53; Mayer, supra note 11, at 25-33.
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terprises.57 Although the consumer movement never attained a de-
gree of cohesion or influence comparable to the labor movement, it
nevertheless serves as a reminder that the individualistic model of
the rational consumer that dominates the discourse of law and eco-
nomics bears little resemblance to historical actors who have agi-
tated for consumer rights. Instead, the campaigns that energized
consumer advocates and their constituencies most often were pro-
tests against unsafe products and deceptive business practices in
which consumers charged that market forces were inadequate to
protect consumers' health or prevent them from being exploited. 58
In these instances, it was the political mobilization of consumers
which affected the level of safety of products, the prices of goods
sold, or the conditions under which the goods were produced. Nota-
bly, at times consumers not only wanted their money's worth, but
were concerned with specific ethical and political issues, such as
child labor and unsafe working conditions. 59
The second recurring theme in the history of the consumer
movement is consumer skepticism about advertising. In each his-
torical period, consumer advocates have complained that very
often advertising neither serves the interests of consumers, nor
protects consumer choice. Rather than provide consumers with the
information they need to make sound selections, advertising can
undermine consumer sovereignty by manipulating consumer pref-
erences and constructing demand for useless or even harmful prod-
ucts. From early efforts to promote standardization of products and
require substantiation for advertising claims, to more contempo-
rary critiques of seductive imagery in ads and the proliferation of
advertising generally, consumer advocates have decried the vol-
ume and the quality of advertising.60 In this important respect, or-
ganized consumer interests have contested the prevailing view
that advertising is crucial to consumer choice or at worst a benign
distraction in the mass marketing of goods.
Thirdly, it is significant that the consumer movement has dis-
proportionately enlisted the energies of women and that the cause
of consumer rights has historically been associated with women's
57. See Creighton, supra note 30, at 69.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 43-47.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33, 42.
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interests. 61 It is not a coincidence that President Johnson selected
Esther Peterson to be the first presidential advisor for consumer
affairs6 2 and that a woman has occupied that post ever since. The
link between women and consumers is historically grounded: Flo-
rence Kelley targeted women for her consumer organization be-
cause they would be more likely to empathize with the plight of
female laborers and had a measure of autonomy with respect to the
purchasing of household items and personal apparel. As volun-
teers, middle-class women also had the time to engage in grass
roots organizing, were less likely to be beholden to an employer
and did not tend to identify with business organizations. On the
cognitive level, the world of business has been associated with
men, while home and personal consumption are coded "female"
and associated with women. Even though women's purchasing
power and their influence as consumers is often exaggerated, this
is one site when women's perspectives have counted heavily.
Finally, the consumer movement in the United States has gen-
erally been associated with the regulation, rather than the deregu-
lation, of business. Although consumer advocates have touted
increased competition as good for consumers and have supported
enforcement of antitrust laws, the remedy of choice has most often
been the passage of consumer protection legislation.6 3 Periods of
consumer activism have been marked by the passage of new laws
and step-ups in enforcement of older measures. For the most part,
it has been accepted that the antidote for big business must be big
government, if the interests of consumers-separate and apart
from business-are to have an effect on public policy or the
economy.
What is perhaps most striking about these four consumer-ori-
ented themes (the collective voice of consumers in opposition to
business; skepticism about the benefits of advertising; the impor-
61. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
62. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 28. Peterson was replaced by Betty Furness,
a TV personality, who surprised her critics by becoming a strong advocate for con-
sumers during her two year tenure. Virginia Knauer held the post during the
Nixon, Ford and Reagan administrations. President Carter selected Peterson to
resume her old post. See id. Bonnie Guiton Hill served during the Bush Adminis-
tration. See United States Government Manual 1990-1991 287 (1990). Leslie L.
Byrne served during the Clinton administration. See United States Government
Manual 1997-1998 263 (1997).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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tance of women's perspectives and the impetus toward the regula-
tion of business) is how infrequently they are sounded in
contemporary policy debates about consumer transactions. The
dormancy of the consumer movement in the 1980s and 1990s is
reflected in legal scholarship which stresses efficiency and the
growth and profitability of business and rarely takes account of the
position of organized consumer groups. It is not surprising that we
find that the course in Consumer Protection has lost its luster. If it
is taught at all, it is marginalized, perhaps taught by an adjunct
professor. The current AALS directory of law teachers lists only 49
faculty members who are currently teaching Consumer Law6
among the 185 law schools included in the directory. Although I do
not want to overstate its popularity in the law school curriculum,
there is little question that both within the basic Torts course and
as a separate offering, Products Liability has grown in importance.
Notably, 102 faculty are listed in the same AALS directory as cur-
rently teaching a course in Products Liability Law.6 5 Thus, the law
student these days is likely to meet the consumer in the garb of an
accident victim in a course primarily about the behavior of manu-
facturers and other business entities.
This development suggests that the status of the consumer
has been downgraded in the implicit hierarchy of the law school
curriculum. If the consumer has not disappeared altogether from
the hidden curriculum,66 surely her stature has diminished. The
interests of consumers are less likely to be addressed in the first
instance, apart from their effect on business. In the course on Prod-
ucts Liability, there is little chance that low-income consumers will
receive specific attention or that the gender or race of consumer/
64. See The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1096-97 (1999-2000). The Direc-
tory lists permanent faculty only, excluding adjunct professors who are hired on a
contract basis to teach a specific course.
65. See id. at 1238-39. It should be noted that neither Consumer Law nor
Products Liability is very popular among the elite law schools. In the top 21 law
schools as measured by the 2000 U.S. News & World Report ranking, only 3 profes-
sors are listed as currently teaching a course in Consumer Law, compared to 7
professors for the course in Products Liability. See U.S. News & World Rep., Mar.
31, 2000.
66. Consumer interests are also very much implicated in the course on Anti-
trust and indeed trust busting was on the agenda of the first wave of the consumer
movement in the United States. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 15-16. However,
like Products Liability, the course on Antitrust is primarily about regulating busi-
ness and promoting competition, with only an indirect focus on the well-being of
the consumer.
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victims will even be noticed. Finally, without a course of their own
(i.e., like the specific offering in Consumer Law), consumer inter-
ests aside from product safety-notably nonphysical interests in
freedom from exploitative and discriminatory practices-are not
likely to be discussed or to stimulate student interest. There is
little space in the current curriculum to consider the consumer as a
whole person. Nor is the objective of empowering consumers as a
social or political group likely to surface in classroom debates in
courses other than Consumer Law.
By noting the vanishing act of the consumer in the law school
curriculum, I do not want to suggest that Products Liability as a
course and as a body of law is not highly important for consumers.
Consumers are indeed protected by the constraints placed on man-
ufacturers and distributors by the current law. My point is simply
to highlight what has been left out or relegated to the margins of
the debate when the focus is predominately about manufacturers'
investment in product safety-namely, the other interests of con-
sumers that are more likely to be seen as antagonistic to business,
particularly an investigation of questionable or exploitative busi-
ness practices that disproportionately affect women, low-income
and minority consumers.
IMPLICT HIERARCHIES IN TORT LAW
This phenomenon of subtly steering the interests of less domi-
nant social groups to the margins of the law and the law school
curriculum is a recurring and important feature of our current sys-
tem. In my scholarship on torts,67 I have been fascinated with im-
plicit hierarchies and have tried to evaluate the deep structures of
tort law to unmask these judgments of value (for a hierarchy is
basically a statement of relative value).6 8 I analyze which social
67. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort
Law, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 463 (1998); Martha Chamallas, Vanished from the First
Year: Lost Torts and Deep Structures in Tort Law, in Legal Cannons (Jack Balkin
& Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
68. A focus on the deep structures of law is very much in keeping with the
spirit of this symposium. In his 1977 article, Amartya Sen argued:
[t]he economic theory of utility, which relates to the theory of rational be-
havior, is sometimes criticized for having too much structure; human be-
ings are alleged to be "simpler" in reality . . [precisely the opposite
seems to be the case: traditional theory has too little structure... The
purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. Economic
theory has been much preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the
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groups are advantaged and disadvantaged by the implicit hierar-
chies, with a special focus on the impact of hierarchies on women
and racial minorities. The most intellectually challenging aspect of
this work has been to consider how these hierarchies are main-
tained, in a legal regime that has long since eliminated most ex-
plicit gender and racial distinctions from the face of the law.6 9 It is
at this point that cognitive bias comes into play. In my view, the
image of the prototypical plaintiff affects how the law categorizes
the very nature of the harm suffered and depresses damage
awards in personal injury litigation for women and racial
minorities.
First, a bit about implicit hierarchies in the law of torts. Al-
though the standard texts generally do not explicitly state so, there
is little question that a higher value is placed on physical injury
and property loss than on emotional injury or relational harm.
This ranking of the types of injuries means that, as a practical
matter, it is far more difficult to recover for both intentionally in-
flicted and negligently inflicted emotional harm. This is accom-
plished in the law by erecting doctrinal hurdles in the form of more
exacting threshold requirements for those plaintiffs who cannot
point to a specific physical injury directly traceable to the defen-
dant's wrongful conduct.
For example, the tort of intentional infliction of mental dis-
tress was recognized only in the later half of the 20th century (in
the torts world, it is a new tort) and is still approached cautiously
glory of his one all-purpose preference ordering. To make room for the dif-
ferent concepts related to his behavior we need a more elaborate
structure.
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Eco-
nomic Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 317, 335-36 (1977).
69. Older legal doctrines that explicitly limited legal recovery exclusively to
one gender have either been abolished or extended on a gender neutral basis. Wo-
men as well as men may now recover for such claims as loss of spousal consortium
and loss of a child's services. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts 931-32, 934-35 (5th ed. 1984). The legal disabilities that prevented
slaves, free persons of color and married women from filing suit on their own be-
half and giving testimony have been lifted by civil right legislation guaranteeing
access to courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994) (guaranteeing blacks the same
rights as whites in civil proceedings); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Prop-
erty Law: 1800-1850, 103 Geo. L.J. 1359, 1423-24 (1983) (discussing legislation
which permitted married women to sue on their own behalf and retain ownership
of legal recoveries).
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by the courts.70 In contrast to the ancient tort of battery (which
requires only that the plaintiff prove an unconsented-to touching of
his or her person), there is no recovery for intentional infliction of
mental distress unless the defendant's action is judged to be "ex-
treme and outrageous" and the plaintiff's distress is characterized
as "severe."71 In theory at least, the intentional infliction of the
most trivial physical harm is a legal wrong. With respect to emo-
tional harm, however, the law responds only to severe injuries and
only if the wrongdoer is of the worst order and deliberately over-
steps the bounds of decency.
One consequence of the nonprivileged status of emotional
harm is that tort law has never provided a solid basis for recover-
ing for sexual harassment. 72 Although some forms of harassment
take the form of physical contact amounting to a battery or assault,
the far more common type of harassment consists of claims of hos-
tile working environments, and involve verbal conduct and pat-
terns of abuse that do not fall neatly into the traditional
intentional tort categories. 73 It is telling that no legal category cap-
tures the full dimensions of sexual harassment as an injury. Tort
law treats it primarily as a dignitary harm under the rubric of
emotional distress.
The numerous empirical studies of sexual harassment in the
workplace indicate that the vast majority of harassment victims
70. See Richard A. Epstein, Torts 18 (1999) ("Liability for this tort is not easy
to establish... juries are allowed to find liability only for behavior that is so ob-
noxious, rude and gratuitously cruel as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency.").
71. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 824-29 (2000). See also Barbara
Lindemann & David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 353-55
(1992) (discussing proof outrageousness in sexual harassment cases).
72. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women
164-174 (1979). The inadequacy of tort law as a basis for redressing the harms of
sexual harassment was what prompted Catharine MacKinnon to call for the recog-
nition of a Title VII claim prohibiting sexual harassment as a form of sex-based
discrimination in employment. See id.
73. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J.
1683, 1762-69 (1998). For example, harassers may seek to undermine a target
employee's competence and confidence by verbally denigrating her abilities, delib-
erately sabotaging her work performance, denying adequate training, ostracizing
her from informal networks, evaluating her by sexist standards, assigning her
demeaning tasks, in addition to subjecting her to sexual assaults, crude overtures
and sexual taunting. See id.
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are women. 74 The law's treatment of sexual harassment is thus of
special importance to women and any lack of protection tends to
have a disparate impact on women. This example illustrates a
broader point. In the abstract, the implicit hierarchies of value look
neutral (physical harm over emotional distress; property damage
over relational interests). They do not appear to be tied to any gen-
der or other social group. Because all persons have a body, emo-
tions, and personal relationships, it is often assumed that people
possess "privileged" and "nonprivileged" interests in equal propor-
tions. As they operate in social context, however, the implicit hier-
archies of value tend to place women and racial minorities at a
disadvantage. The important and recurring injuries in women's
lives often tend to be classified as lower-ranked emotional or rela-
tional harm, or as noneconomic loss. This process of devaluation is
hidden under the maze of special doctrinal rules for particular
types of cases.
The gender impact of the low status of relational harm is most
evident in the legal treatment of injuries sustained by persons who
care for children. When a child suffers an injury or death, people
who have a special responsibility for caring for the child typically
also suffer a grievous loss. Particularly after a serious nonfatal ac-
cident, the caretaker must learn to deal with the child's resulting
physical disability and the enormous change in daily routine that
this often causes. For both the caretaker and the child, such an
accident can be a life-altering event.'6
Under current law, the child has a "primary" tort claim for the
injury suffered, including an amount for medical and other rehabil-
itative expenses associated with the child's injury. The devastating
impact of the accident on the daily life of the caretaker, however, is
eclipsed because in most states there is no separate claim for the
74. Two studies of the federal workplace found that 42% of women exper-
ienced some form of sexual harassment during a two-year period. See Deborah L.
Siegel, National Council on Research for Women, Sexual Harassment: Research
and Resources 9 (Susan A. Hallgarth & Mary Ellen S. Capek eds., 1991). In com-
parison, from 1992-1996, approximately 10% of the sexual harassment complaints
filed with the EEOC were filed by men. See Telephone interview with EEOC Head-
quarters (Mar. 3, 1998). But see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc. 523 U.S.
75 (1998) (indicating a growing recognition of the phenomenon of same-sex harass-
ment of men by male supervisors and co-workers).
75. See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues
in a Torts Class, 1 Yale J.L. & Feminism 41, 50-51 (1989).
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caretaker's loss of consortium.76 Even in liberal states that allow
parents to recover for loss of consortium when their child is in-
jured, there may be a further negative racial impact. This impact
occurs because even in these liberal states no recognition is given
to injuries suffered by primary caretakers other than parents who
take on primary caretaking roles. This limitation has a dispropor-
tionate impact on African Americans and other ethnic groups in
which extended family members-most often grandparents-have
the primary responsibility for raising children.
Closely related to the implicit hierarchy for types of injuries is
another hidden value system in the law of torts, the implicit hier-
archy of types of damages, which ranks pecuniary over nonpecu-
niary damages. I should note that many types of injuries give rise
to both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. Thus, plaintiffs who
suffer physical injury not only seek recovery for pecuniary dam-
ages consisting of medical expenses, wage loss and loss of future
earning capacity. They also seek to recover for nonpecuniary dam-
ages of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. Similarly, a
plaintiff suing for negligent infliction of mental distress typically
has pecuniary, as well as nonpecuniary, losses. Such a victim is
likely to incur medical expenses and loss of income. Thus, the hier-
archy of damages operates within categories of types of injury to
give higher priority to the pecuniary and economic aspects of the
damage claim.
The implicit hierarchy of damages privileging economic over
noneconomic damages is most evident in statutory proposals for
tort reform, particularly the movement to put caps on noneconomic
damages in actions for products liability and medical malprac-
tice.77 By 1990, some kind of cap or limit on noneconomic damages
has been enacted in well over half the states, some extending be-
yond health care and products liability to encompass all personal
injuries.78 The claim by proponents of the caps is that the caps are
warranted because the "real" losses, i.e., the economic damages,
are still available, the implication being that noneconomic loss is
somehow less essential to a fair system of compensation.
76. Most states restrict claims for loss of consortium to loss of spousal consor-
tium. See Dobbs, supra note 71, at 841-42.
77. See id. at 1072.
78. See id. at 1071-72.
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Critics of caps are now beginning to assess the negative gender
impact of such tort reform. An empirical study by Thomas Koenig
and Michael Rustad79 showed that women stand to lose more when
"nonprivileged" types of damages are curtailed. Their study re-
vealed that two out of three plaintiffs receiving punitive damages
in medical malpractice litigation are women, often in gender-
linked cases involving mismanaged childbirth, cosmetic surgery,
sexual abuse and neglect in nursing homes.80 In general,
noneconomic damages are particularly significant to women be-
cause they serve to offset the disproportionately low value placed
on women's claims when those measures of value are solely eco-
nomic and market-based. 8 '
The mechanisms that maintain the hierarchies of value in tort
law in this gender-neutral age are cognitive processes that influ-
ence the thinking of even people who sincerely believe they are un-
biased. The hierarchies of value not only set up a ranking of
different types of injuries and types of damages, they also establish
pairs of opposites or dualisms. Embedded within the hierarchies
are three contrasting categories: physical/emotional, property/rela-
tional and economic/noneconomic. These categories are themselves
"gendered," meaning that if we were asked to link each type of
damage or harm with the adjective "male" or "female" there would
be widespread agreement that the left side of the pair (physical,
property, economic) should be labeled "male," while the right side
of the pair (emotional, relational, noneconomic) should be labeled
"female."
At work here is a perceptual process which categorizes injury
sustained by women as emotional, relational, or noneconomic, even
when the same injury could, as a matter of logic, be characterized
as physical, property-like or economic. The basic point is that in
deciding how to categorize a loss, we consider not only the nature
of the injury, but also who we believe suffers the loss. The gender
of the prototypical plaintiff affects the way we categorize the na-
ture of the harm.
79. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender
Injustice in Disguise, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1995).
80, See id.
81. See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-
Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 73, 81-89 (1994) (discussing gender bias in calculation of lost earning
capacity).
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This perceptual process is akin to the process that occurs when
people interpret ambiguous behavior. Consider the psychological
experiments measuring human perception, when subjects are
asked to describe an interaction between two people involving a
poke or a shove.8 2 The action is ambiguous, in the sense that it
could possibly be classified as benign (dramatizes, gives informa-
tion, plays around) or threatening (aggressive, violent, mean). The
studies indicated that the race of the actor is important in deter-
mining how the action will be interpreted or categorized.8 3 Thus,
whites tend to interpret the ambiguous behavior of black actors as
being more threatening and more hostile than the same behavior
undertaken by white actors. The identity of the actor affects how
we perceive the nature of the action.
This perceptual process is at work in the social construction of
tort categories, affecting where the line is drawn between physical
and mental injuries and economic and noneconomic loss. For ex-
ample, in a study of fright-based injuries, historian Linda K. Ker-
ber and I analyzed the classic "mental distress" cases involving
female plaintiffs who suffered miscarriages and stillbirths as a re-
sult of emotional trauma.s4 In a very real sense, these plaintiffs
suffered physical injuries and, as many early commentators
pointed out, their cases could easily have been judged by the prin-
ciples applied to negligence litigation generally.85 Instead, their
claims were categorized as "emotional harm" cases.86 In this one
class of litigation, the law fixed on fright, the mechanism of the
injury, rather than on the ultimate physical consequences of the
82. See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Inter-
group Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of the Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 Personal-
ity & Soc. Psychol. 590, 595-97 (1976), discussed in Jody Armour, Stereotypes and
Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Stereotyping Habit, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. 733, 752-54 (1995); H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and
Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggres-
sive Acts, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 590, 593-95 (1980), discussed in Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1204-
07 (1995).
83. See Duncan, supra note 82, at 595-98.
84. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law
of Fright: A History, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 814 (1990).
85. See Francis Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury from Negligence Without
Impact, 50 Am. L. Rev. 141, 172 (1902); Herbert Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance
as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 495, 503 (1922).
86. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 84, at 834.
2000]
30 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:9
defendant's actions.87 Once classified as emotional harm, moreo-
ver, the various restrictive doctrines came into play to reduce the
chances of recovery."8 When faced with a choice-a choice that is
always present when we construct categories-the law matched the
type of injury (emotional) to the prototypical plaintiff (a pregnant
woman). Cognitive bias thus operated in the construction of the
deep structures of tort law to eclipse and downgrade certain inju-
ries and interests, while maintaining a framework that looked gen-
der-neutral and universal.
POSTSCRIPT
A variant of the cognitive bias that has functioned to
marginalize emotional, relational and noneconomic injuries in tort
law is at work in the law's treatment of consumer interests. At
least in the law school curriculum, nonphysical injuries of consum-
ers are not given a high priority and are separated from the more
extended discussion of manufacturer liability for unsafe products.
This decoupling of consumers' interests makes it less likely that
the issues and themes that organized consumer groups historically
have placed on the agenda will surface and will receive sustained
analysis. It also permits business-oriented models of the rational
consumer to be accepted uncritically by a new generation of law-
yers. The disappearance of the consumer from the mainstream of
legal inquiry subtly pushes women's perspectives and injuries that
disproportionately harm women to the sidelines. Ironically, al-
though women are regarded as the prototypical consumers, their
voices are not often heard in legal debates about products liability
and related consumer issues. The dominant discourse is saturated
with economic analysis, without much of a sense of history or
politics.
I suspect that the low status of consumer law and consumer
issues will not change unless and until the consumer movement re-
emerges in the larger culture. It is interesting to note that in the
last year, Nader-connected groups89 joined forces with grass-roots
87. See id. at 826-32 (discussing the reasoning of the courts in cases involving
miscarriages due to fright).
88. See id. at 832-33.
89. Nader's group, Public Citizen, played a critical role in uniting the dispa-
rate groups to oppose what they have dubbed the "corporate-managed" trade fos-
tered by the World Trade organization. See Dori Jones Yang, Hell, No. We Won't
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environmental and pro-union forces to launch protests against the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle and later against the
World Bank in Washington, D.C. 90 One of the prime targets of the
groups-protesting the use by multinational corporations of sweat-
shops and child labor in Latin America and other Third World
countries-is reminiscent of the campaign of the National Consum-
ers League at the turn of the 20th century,91 although this time
with a global rather than national focus. The strategy of attacking
international bureaucracies like the WTO and the World Bank also
resembles Nader's move of scrutinizing federal agencies in the
1970s, 92 a move that puts pressure on the regulators to take more
account of the interests of workers and low-income consumers. It is
far too soon to tell whether this new globally-focused "corporate
accountability movement"93 will become the fourth wave of the
consumers movement in the United States. It is just possible, how-
ever, that consumers will make their next appearance in the law
school curriculum in courses on International Trade and Interna-
tional Human Rights.
Trade: How an Obscure Trade Organization Became a Lightning Rod for Protest,
U.S. News, Nov. 11, 1999.
90. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Power Back to the People, 86 ABA Journal 52
(July 2000).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
93. See Margot Hornblower, The Politics of Coffee, Time Mag., Apr. 17, 2000
(describing protests in Seattle as part of the "corporate accountability movement").
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